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1 Introduction10
While rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distribu-11
tions are quite interesting, basic issues such as existence and uniqueness of a12
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) have been addressed only partially.13
Indeed, previous work on the issue of existence focused either on symmetric14
contests (Fey, 2008; Ryvkin, 2010) or on the case of a continuous technol-15
ogy (Wasser, 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, little general was known about the16
uniqueness of the equilibrium.17
Below, it is shown that in any rent-seeking contest with independent and18
continuous types, there exists a unique PSNE.1 The result holds even when19
the contest is ex-ante asymmetric,2 so that the equilibrium may entail in-20
active types.3 Moreover, no restriction is imposed on the shape of the type21
distributions. Generally, existence ensures consistency of a model, whereas22
uniqueness strengthens numerical analyses, theoretical results, and experi-23
mental ndings.24
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the25
set-up. Existence is dealt with in Section 3. Section 4 discusses uniqueness.26
A numerical illustration can be found in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. An27
Appendix contains technical lemmas.28
1Uniqueness means here that for any given player, any two PSNE strategies di¤er at
most on a null set. This corresponds to the strongest form of uniqueness for PSNE.
2Asymmetry may be reected, e.g., in heterogeneous distributions of marginal costs or
in heterogeneous economies of scale.
3Wärneryd (2003) explicitly allows for inactive types in a common-value setting.
1
2 Set-up29
There are N  2 players. Each player i = 1; :::; N observes a signal (or30
type) ci, drawn from an interval Di = [ci; ci], where 0 < ci < ci. Signals are31
independent across players. Moreover, player i does not observe the signal32
cj of any other player j 6= i. The distribution function of player is signal is33
denoted by Fi = Fi(ci). Each player i chooses a level of activity yi  0 at34
cost gi(yi). It is assumed that gi(0) = 0, and that gi is twice continuously35
di¤erentiable on R+, with g0i > 0 on R++, and g00i  0. Player is payo¤ is36
i(yi; y i; ci) = pi(yi; y i)   cigi(yi), where pi(yi; y i) = yi=(yi +
P
j 6=i yj) if37
yi +
P
j 6=i yj > 0, and pi(yi; y i) = 1=N otherwise.
4
38
A strategy for player i is a (measurable) mapping i : Di ! R+. De-39
note by Si the set of strategies for player i. For a prole  i = fjgj 6=i 240
S i =
Q
j 6=i Sj, and a type ci 2 Di, player is interim expected payo¤ is given41
by i(yi;  i; ci) =
R
D i
i(yi;  i(c i); ci)dF i(c i), where D i =
Q
j 6=iDj,42
 i(c i) = fj(cj)gj 6=i, and dF i(c i) =
Q
j 6=i dFj(cj). A Bayesian Nash43
equilibrium (BNE) is a prole  = fi gNi=1 2 S =
QN
i=1 Si such that44
i(

i (ci); 

 i; ci)  i(yi;  i; ci) for any i = 1; :::; N , any ci 2 Di, and45
any yi  0. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is a prole  2 S46
such that for any i = 1; :::; N , and for almost any ci 2 Di, the inequality47
i(

i (ci); 

 i; ci)  i(yi;  i; ci) holds for any yi  0.548
4As usual, a simple change of variables allows to capture other types of contest success
functions and other forms of uncertainty, e.g., about valuations. Cf. Ryvkin (2010).
5As shown in the Appendix, this amounts to the standard denition.
2
3 Existence49
This section builds on prior work by Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010), and Wasser50
(2013a). Existence is shown rst for the "-constrained contest, for " > 0, in51
which each player i = 1; :::; N may use only strategies with values in [";1).52
Lemma 3.1 There is a level of activity E > 0 such that, for any su¢ -53
ciently small " > 0, there exists a BNE " in the "-constrained contest such54
that each player is strategy "i is continuous, monotone, and bounded by E.55
Proof. Since costs are strictly increasing and convex, there is an E >56
0 such that any yi > E is suboptimal. Moreover, i exhibits decreasing57
di¤erences in yi and ci. Hence, existence of a monotone PSNE e" in the "-58
constrained contest follows from Athey (2001, Cor. 2.1). Note now that type59
cis "-constrained problem, maxyi"i(yi; e" i; ci), has a unique solution yi =60
"i (ci). Indeed, if e" i(c i) 6= 0 with positive probability, then i(; e" i; ci)61
is strictly concave on ["; E], while otherwise, the unique solution is yi = ".62
Hence, "i (ci) = e"i (ci) with probability one, for any i = 1; :::; N . This implies63
that "i (ci) is also type cis best response to 
"
 i, for any i = 1; :::; N , and64
any ci 2 Di. Thus, " = ("1; :::; "N) is a BNE in the "-constrained contest.65
Clearly, each "i is monotone. Finally, continuity of 
"
i follows from Berges66
Theorem, as i(; " i; ) is continuous on the compact set ["; E]Di. 67
Consider now a sequence f"mg1m=1 such that "m & 0, and select a BNE m68
in the "m-constrained contest for each m 2 N, with the properties specied69
in the previous lemma.70
Lemma 3.2 The sequence fmg1m=1 has a uniformly converging subse-71
3
quence.72
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.1 and the Theorem of Arzelà-Ascoli, it su¢ ces73
to nd a  > 0 such that mi has everywhere a slope exceeding   for any74
m 2 N and any i. In terms of the transformed choice variable yi = yi + ci,75
a type cis expected payo¤ in m may be written as76


i (y

i ; 
m
 i; ci) =
Z
D i
(yi   ci)dF i(c i)
yi   ci +
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)
  cigi(yi   ci), (1)77
provided that yi   ci = yi > 0. Hence, for  su¢ ciently large, the cross-78
partial79
@2

i
@yi @ci
=
Z
D i
2
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)dF i(c i)
yi +
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)
3   g0i(yi) + cig00i (yi)| {z }
0
(2)80
 2
NE
Z
D i
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)dF i(c i)
yi +
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)
2   g0i(yi) (3)81


2ci
NE
  1

g0i(yi) (4)82
is seen to be positive in the range of ci where yi = mi (ci) > 0. Thus, for 83
large, yi is weakly increasing in ci, which proves the claim. 84
By Lemma 3.2, one may assume that fmg1m=1 converges uniformly to85
some  2 S. Next, it is shown that in , at least one player is active with86
probability one.87
Lemma 3.3 There is some player i such that i (ci) > 0 with probability88
one.89
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Proof. Suppose that for each i, there is a set Di  Di of positive measure90
such that i (ci) = 0 for all ci 2 Di. Then, by uniform convergence, there91
exists, for any " > 0, an m0 = m0(") such that mi (ci) < " for any i, any92
ci 2 Di, and any m  m0. But, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition for type ci93
in the "m-constrained contest,94
0 
Z
D i
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)dF i(c i)
mi (ci) +
P
j 6=i 
m
j (cj)
2   cig0i(E), (5)95
where D i =
Q
j 6=iDj. Integrating over Di, and subsequently summing over96
i = 1; :::; N , one obtains97
0 
Z
D
(N   1)dF (c)PN
i=1 
m
i (ci)
 
NP
i=1
g0i(E)
Z
Di
cidFi(ci), (6)98
where D = QNi=1Di and dF (c) = QNi=1 dFi(ci). For " small, however, this is99
impossible. 100
The following is the rst main result of this paper.101
Theorem 3.4 In the unconstrained contest,  is a PSNE in continuous102
and monotone strategies.103
Proof. Fix a player i 2 f1; :::; Ng. For any m 2 N, since m is a104
BNE in the "m-constrained contest, i(mi (ci); 
m
 i; ci)  i(yi; m i; ci) for105
any ci 2 Di and any yi  "m. Therefore, if the event  i(c i) = 0 is null,106
letting m ! 1 implies i(i (ci);  i; ci)  i(yi;  i; ci) for any ci 2 Di107
and any yi > 0. Suppose next that  i(c i) = 0 with positive probability.108
Then, by Lemma 3.3, i (ci) > 0 with probability one. Let ci 2 Di with109
5
i (ci) > 0. If yi > 0, then the argument proceeds as above. To complete110
the proof, note that i(;  i; ci) is l.s.c., so that yi = 0 cannot be the only111
protable deviation for ci. 112
4 Uniqueness113
Consider two PSNE  and  such that, for some player i, the event i (ci) 6=114
i (ci) has positive probability. Then, as noted below, 
 and  must di¤er115
in an essential way for at least two players.116
Lemma 4.1 There are players i 6= j such that each of the independent117
events i (ci) 6= i (ci) and j(cj) 6= j (cj) has positive probability.118
Proof. Suppose there is some i such that  i(c i) = 

 i(c i) with119
probability one. Then, i(;  i; ci) = i(;  i; ci) for any ci 2 Di. Thus,120
i (ci) = 

i (ci) with probability one, which is a contradiction. 121
The following is the second main result of this paper.122
Theorem 4.2 The PSNE in the unconstrained contest is unique.123
Proof. Following Rosen (1965), write ;s = (1 s)+s for 0  s  1,124
and consider125
s =
NX
i=1
Z
Di
i(
;s; ci) (i (ci)  i (ci)) dFi(ci) (7)126
for s = 0; 1, where i(; ci) = @i(i(ci);  i; ci)=@yi denotes type cis mar-127
ginal expected payo¤ at a prole  2 S.6 From the Kuhn-Tucker con-128
6It is shown in the Appendix that 0 and 1 are well-dened.
6
ditions, i(; ci)  0 for almost any ci 2 Di; moreover, i (ci) = 0 if129
i(
; ci) < 0. It follows that 0  0, and similarly, 1  0. To pro-130
voke a contradiction, it will be shown now that 1   0 < 0. Denote by131
i(; ci; c i) = @i(i(ci);  i(c i); ci)=@yi type cis marginal ex-post payo¤132
at  2 S, when facing c i 2 D i. Then, by Lemma A.2 in the Appendix,133
1   0 =
Z
D
NX
i=1
(i(
; ci; c i)  i(; ci; c i))zi(ci)dF (c) (8)134
=
Z
D
NX
i=1
Z 1
0
@i(
;s; ci; c i)
@s
zi(ci)ds

dF (c), (9)135
where zi(ci) = i (ci)  i (ci). An application of the chain rule delivers136
@i(
;s; ci; c i)
@s
=
NX
j=1
@2pi(
;s
i (ci); 
;s
 i (c i))
@yi@yj
zj(cj)  ci g00i (;si (ci))| {z }
0
zi(ci),
(10)137
for any i, any ci 2 Di, and any c i 2 D i. It follows that138
1   0 
Z
D
 Z 1
0
 
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
@2pi(
;s
i (ci); 
;s
 i (c i))
@yi@yj
zi(ci)zj(cj)
!
ds
!
dF (c).
(11)139
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One can verify, however, that140
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
@2pi(yi; y i)
@yi@yj
zizj (12)141
=  
NX
i=1
2Y i
Y 3
z2i +
NX
i=1
X
j 6=i
Y   2Y i
Y 3
zizj (13)142
=   2
Y 3
NX
i=1
Y iz2i  
2
Y 3
NX
i=1
X
j>i
X
k 6=i;j
ykzizj (14)143
=   1
Y 3
NX
i=1
Y iz2i  
1
Y 3
NX
i=1
NX
j=1
X
k 6=i;j
ykzizj (15)144
=   1
Y 3
NX
i=1
(z2i Y i + yiZ
2
 i)  0 (16)145
for any (y1; :::; yN) 2 RN+nf0g and any (z1; :::; zN) 2 RN , where Y =
PN
i=1 yi,146
Y i =
P
j 6=i yj, and Z i =
P
j 6=i zj. Moreover, z
2
i Y i = zi(ci)
2
P
j 6=i 
;s
j (cj) is147
positive for any s 2 (0; 1) if i (ci) 6= i (ci) and j(cj) 6= j (cj) for some148
j 6= i. Thus, by Lemma 4.1, 1   0 < 0. 149
5 Numerical illustration150
Figure 1 shows PSNE strategies in a two-player lottery contest, where types151
are distributed uniformly on D1 = [0:01; 1:01] and D2 = [0:51; 5:51], respec-152
tively. Note that player 2 remains inactive for c2 > c2  4:21.153
154
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155
Figure 1: An equilibrium involving inactive types156
6 Concluding remark157
While this paper has focused on the existence and uniqueness of a PSNE in158
asymmetric rent-seeking contests, it follows from the proofs that also any of159
the BNE studied by Fey (2008) and Ryvkin (2010) is unique.160
7 Appendix: Technical lemmas161
Lemma A.1 A prole  2 S is a PSNE in the unconstrained contest if and162
only if
R
D
i(

i (ci); 

 i(c i); ci)dF (c) 
R
D
i(bi(ci);  i(c i); ci)dF (c) for163
any i = 1; :::; N , and any bi 2 Si.164
Proof. Let  be a PSNE, and consider a deviation bi 2 Si for some165
player i. Then, i(i (ci); 

 i; yi)  i(bi(ci);  i; ci) for almost any ci 2 Di.166
Integrating over Di, the assertion follows via Fubinis theorem. Conversely,167
9
suppose that  is not a PSNE. Then, there is a player i and a set Di  Di168
of positive measure such that i (ci) is not a best response to 

 i for ci, for169
any ci 2 Di. Dene bi(ci) as cis best response to  i if it exists; otherwise170
as i (ci)=2 if 

i (ci) > 0, and as prf i(c i) = 0g=(2cig0i(E)) if i (ci) = 0.171
Then bi is a protable deviation. 172
Lemma A.2 Let  2 S be a PSNE in the unconstrained contest. Then,173
for almost any ci 2 Di, the function i(; ci; ) is integrable, with i(; ci) =174 R
D i
i(
; ci; c i)dF i(c i). Moreover, i(; ) is integrable.175
Proof. The rst claim is obvious if i (ci) > 0 for almost any ci 2 Di.176
Suppose that i (ci) = 0 with positive probability. Then, by Lemma 3.3, the177
event  i(c i) = 0 is null. Take some c i 2 D i with  i(c i) 6= 0. Then,178
for any ci 2 Di, by concavity, the di¤erence quotient i(yi;  i(c i); ci)=yi179
is monotone increasing as yi & 0, with limit i(; ci; c i). Since also180
i(yi; 

 i(c i); ci)=yi   cig0i(E), the rst claim follows from Levis theorem.181
The second claim follows from Lebesgues theorem, because i(; )  0 from182
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and because i(; )   cig0i(E), as above. 183
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